EXHIBIT 6

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: . Case No. 01-01139 (JKF)

Jointly Administered

W.R. GRACE & COMPANY,

et al., . 5414 U.S. Steel Tower

600 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Debtors.

. June 22, 2009

9:04 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
BEFORE HONORABLE JUDITH K. FITZGERALD

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Debtors: Kirkland & Ellis, LLP

By: DAVID BERNICK, ESQ.
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apply to loan agreements. It says it right in the Code, and I'm happy to review it with particularity.

THE COURT: No, I understand, and you're concept of the fact that even the filing of bankruptcy without the ipso facto clause would accelerate the payments. That's why you have a claim that you can file is not something that I even think I need to have you argue.

MR. COBB: So, Your Honor, with -- just so I'm clear, I want to -- because I want to walk carefully through this, 10 \ Your Honor agrees with me that the filing of the bankruptcy case is a default.

THE COURT: No, I agree that it accelerates the payments under the loan, because that's what you have to do in order to file your claim.

MR. COBB: Okay.

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THE COURT: The Bankruptcy Code will accelerate all the obligations up to the point of the filing of the bankruptcy. So any obligation that is due you can file your claim for. Not stated very well, but --

MR. COBB: All right. That's okay, Your Honor. me see if I understand. So if I can show Your Honor in the loan agreements where the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding is a default, and that default kicks in default interest, I can sit down.

> THE COURT: I don't know. Show me -- wait till I

that the simple answer on impairment is 1124(1), under PPIE. PPIE says, you give force to whatever bankruptcy limitations apply and that includes 502, 726, therefore, no impairment because the limitation that we're invoking is 502, perhaps, 726, either way we work.

We then get to Column 2, which is, they say, TAC, is there such -- and the preliminary question on TAC on is, is there such a thing as TAC on? Is there such a thing as a source of a right to interest that goes beyond the claim.

THE COURT: Okay, I got it. We don't have to redo that.

MR. BERNICK: Yes. And it's the same basic deal, but the proof of the pudding, the proof of the pudding, this is why what they're doing is so key here, is that 502 speaks directly to unmatured interest as of the date of the filing.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. BERNICK: And their particular, their particular 18 breed of entitlement to unmatured interest is the provision of 19 their loan document that speaks the moment the petition is 20 | filed. This might be different if they had a condition in their contract that they could argue gave rise to a default post petition. We could still argue about whether 502 still 23 was a bar, but 502 specifically addresses the particular kind of provision that they've got here. It basically trumps, you could read -- you know, you read 502, 502 specifically, on the

moment, trumps the kind of provision that they're invoking, which is, rights that are triggered by the very fact of filing. Indeed, you could say that effectively, 502 accomplishes the same effect as the ipso facto precedence. It says, you can't improve your position by virtue of the debtor having filed, which then goes back to Your Honor's argument.

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Your Honor's argument says that that's essentially what we're saying, is that the debtor in taking advantage of the fact that they're permitted to file the petition, thereby, and gets into the protection of bankruptcy, including against impairment arguments, by virtue of having filed.

And, therefore, and that's right, this really is 13 exactly the kind of -- if this provision is enforced, notwithstanding 502, it basically always enables every single time, the unsecured creditors to get what 502 would otherwise deny them.

THE COURT: Well, okay. Your argument, if I 18 understand it correctly is, that 502 sets the allowed claim. In 19 this instance, I've defined the allowed claim as not including 20 any unmatured interest, which is what 502(b)(2) tells me I have to do by operation of law.

MR. BERNICK: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So, their unmatured -- or I'm 24 sorry, their prepetition allowed claim, as I've defined it and 25 ruled, is the principal without interest. The debtors' plan

1 position that it was wrong, well then we're going to walk right through the door and we're going to put in some more evidence on that, it's not just a declaration, there's more that's there. But, yes, we believe that Your Honor got it right on non-payment the first time.

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With respect to the payment portions, they're now focused and they argue the acceleration provision and the lack of need for notice, we say, okay, let's talk about that. We thought before that that was disposed of because it's, 10 deffectively, an ipso facto provision and ipso facto provisions are not favored, in fact, we've got more cases that are outside 12 the 365 context, but even if you were to acknowledge that they've got this provision and even if this provision were to 14 read out in some fashion as being applicable to this case, it can't trump 502, because 502 speaks specifically to this. if 502 speaks specifically to it, then they can't get to impairment under PPIE.

502 says -- where's 502?

THE COURT: Well, the 365 argument, of course, is still talking about contracts, even contracts to make loans that are executory, and carves out an exception to those contracts. So, I'm not sure 365 applies in this context, I don't think anybody has ever argued that this contract, the loan that's at issue, is executory. So, I don't think 365(e)(2) applies at all to the circumstances here.

MR. BERNICK: But we also believe that the ipso facto law is not confined to 365.

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THE COURT: Well, there are cases that would support that view, there are also cases that would talk about financial accommodations in a slightly different context. I'm not sure I 6 need to get there, I don't think 365 applies. At least if it does, I've never heard a word, by anybody, suggesting that this is an executory contract. So, I don't think 365, in that sense, is operative in this case.

With respect to the 502 argument you're making, I understand it. So, why don't we take a break, if you want to cite a couple of cases when we get back, we'll do that, and I'll give you a chance, Mr. Cobb, after the break. We're taking a ten minute recess.

> UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Sorry, Your Honor. (Recess)

THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr. Bernick, before 18 you begin, I want to note for the record that I have had the 19∥ Sheppards checked on both on West Law and on LEXUS, again, for 20∥ the <u>NextWave</u> opinion that we cited in the opinion and I can't 21 see any place that it's been vacated, reversed, overruled. In 22 fact, I can't even see that it was appealed. So, if somebody 23∥ has an indication of where that is, I would like it. There are 24 a series of NextWave cases that have, in fact, been vacated on 25 appeal, but not the one we cited.

we've been talking about here.

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We're saying that 502, by its very terms, is in a sense, a specific ruling on de facto in the context of unmatured interest because is speaks specifically to unmatured interest as of the date of the filing and the ipso facto clause that they're talking about, obviously, is as of the date of the filing. So, it's right on point and, obviously, would then trigger the non-impairment argument under PPIE in exactly the fashion that we've indicated.

But counsel is kind of at pains to suggest that 11 somehow ipso facto clauses are only disfavored in the context 12 of 365. And the answer to that is no. 365 addresses ipso 13 facto, but so does 541 and Judge Walrath's decision in the 14 context of the <u>EBCI</u> case, specifically deals with Section 541, 15 which has to do with property of the estate, and says that ipso 16 facto clauses do not control what constitutes property of the estate. The estate can't be divested of property rights by 18 virtue of an ipso facto clause.

So -- and, then she goes on to comment, Judge Walrath 20∥ goes on to comment that they are, generally ipso facto clauses 21 are generally disfavored, if not outright unenforceable, under the bankruptcy code. It's broad language, but that's a 23 particularly appropriate observation in this case because there's not just one, but there's clearly more than one, 25 there's 541, and we would say, 502, all of them express exactly

the same policy. Exactly the same policy. And under 502 it's not a policy, it is an actual provision that under PPIE means that there can't be impairment to the extent that clause does not result in acceleration.

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In the course of the break, my bankruptcy mentor, Theodore Freedman, also pointed out to me that there is an additional provision of 1124 that we ought to focus on and that 8 is 1124(2). We've only been talking about 1124(1), but if you talk about 1124(2), this applies, this says a class is impaired under a plan with respect to each claim or interest of such class unless, with respect to each claim, the plan -- I don't have the highlighter but -- notwithstanding any contractual 13 \parallel provision, or applicable law that entitles the holder of such claim or interest, to demand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default, which is what they're arguing, (a) cures any such default of a cure before or after the commencement of the case under this title, other than a default of a kind, specified kind, not the default specified in 365(b)(2) of the kind of this title, or of a kind that 365(b)(2) expressly does not require to be cured.

What this says is that if the plan cures a default that otherwise gives rise to a demand for accelerated payment, if it cures a default, then there's not impairment. effectively, our plan cures the default to the extent that there was non-payment of principal and interest. Effectively,

it does that and, therefore, really, unless you've got the --unless the ipso facto clause is to be recognized.

So, our plan also is unimpaired with respect to the lender group by virtue of 124(2) and then it says, but then goes further. It says, well, the question is, well, are we curing default insofar as a default rate of interest is concerned, and the answer is no. We're not. But you take a look at the remainder of the language of 1124(2)(a), it specifically excludes that kind of default that does -- essentially does not need to be cured. What does that refer to?

Well, if you take a look at 365(b)(2) --

THE COURT: Well, 365 isn't going to apply anyway.

MR. BERNICK: I understand that. But that was the first thing I pushed back on Mr. Freedman for, but I think he's correct, which is that this refers to a default of a kind specified, it is the kind of default. In other words, this is not a provision that is simply reading out to 365. This is a more general provision. This provision says that if your plan cures a default, that's the basis of a claim for acceleration, it's not impairment. However, it also further says, you don't have to cure the kind of default that wouldn't have to be cured under 362. And what does that mean? It's 362(b)(2) and that, of course, is defaults that include the commencement of the case.

THE COURT: The commencement of the case.

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MR. BERNICK: So, if you take a look at 1124(2)(a), (2)(a) recognizes now in the context of impairment, specifically. Here we were talking about 502 means, that ipso 5 facto causes giving rise to acceleration are not recognized as 6 being allowable, now in the context of impairment, if we take a look at 1124(2), 1124(2) recognizes that (a), where you've cured, it's not impaired, and we have cured -- we have more than cured with respect to the non-default contract rate and, therefore, we're okay here, then they said -- and then to answer the point that we haven't cured with respect to the default, contract default rate, the answer is, we don't have to 13 cure because this contemplates that those kinds of defaults are not being recognized by the code. And that is specifically --

THE COURT: Okay. Can I get back to what we were supposed to be doing today, because the time is two hours past it and we only have through Wednesday to get through everything.

MR. BERNICK: Right.

THE COURT: We were supposed to be here for an evidentiary hearing. Are there any facts that are in dispute because you folks can argue all of this in a supplemental I think that <u>PPI</u> addresses somewhat this issue that brief. you're raising now, in any event. The thing about PPI is it doesn't say what the rate of interest is that has to be applied

Court on whatever schedule you think is appropriate.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pasquale?

MR. PASQUALE: Thank you, Your Honor, Ken Pasquale for the Committee. Mr. Freedman will be surprised, but I stand to help the debtors.

We talked about this a little bit on Thursday and now 7 I'm focused on the non-lender claims, of which Morgan Stanley is one, but the non-lender claims in Class 9.

We did, for the committee, raise various objections with respect to the treatment of that group of creditors, and just so the record is clear, it is true the provisions in the 12 plan were suggested by the committee and negotiated with the debtors. That doesn't bind any individual creditor like Morgan Stanley, that's the Kensington case that's been cited to the Court many times from the Third Circuit.

With respect to the committee's objection, however, with respect to that sub-group of creditors in Class 9, the debtors have made a statement that they are going to modify the language with respect to the litigation protocol, to make clear that no creditors legal, contractual, equitable rights, the language from 1124, will be impacted by the procedures.

We wanted to be sure to preserve the argument that any of those creditors had, to argue anything, both a default rate, a contractual rate different from that provided in the plan, interest on interest, whatever arguments they may have.

talk about this and we'll finalize the scheduling issues tomorrow.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

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MR. BROWN: Yeah, we're a little confused, but I think we can take it up tomorrow morning.

THE COURT: Well, this is what I have so far, if this will help, but, you know, if you want to modify it, you can let 8 me know in the morning. The debtor is to submit all of their evidence to the insurers by July 2nd. Well, let's start with tomorrow. We'll put all of the insurer evidence in tomorrow. Then the debtors will do their counter-designations by July 2nd. By July 16, everybody's briefs are due, limited to 30 pages. So I expect one collective insurance brief and one collective plan proponent brief. If you can't do it collectively, you can divide up the number of pages among you, but 30 pages. That's what I'm aiming for because I already 17 have massive briefs.

I don't want you to restate a single thing. What I'm 19 looking for is a post-trial submission, not a pretrial 20∥ submission. Don't redo it. I don't want to read it again. 21∥ I've been through it already. It took me a long time. I don't want -- and I don't want it repeated. Okay. Argument, if I need it, would be on July 22nd which is Tuesday at 9:00.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: 21st, Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: 21st.